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A large number of biological agents can cause natural or bioterroristic disease outbreaks and each can present in a bewildering
number of ways (e.g., a few cases versus many cases, conﬁned to a building versus widely disseminated). This problem space is a
challenge for designers of early warning systems for disease outbreaks and the sheer size of this space is a barrier to progress.
This paper addresses this problem by deriving nine categories of threats that represent a parsimonious characterization of the
problem space. A literature search also identiﬁed one or more example outbreaks for each of the nine categories. These outbreaks
have occurred in recent times and could be used by researchers in need of actual outbreak data for investigations of the role of
diﬀerent types of surveillance data and algorithms in outbreak detection.
The methodological contribution of this research is a Criterion Set of threats for analysis and evaluation of detection systems.
This set characterizes the problem space in a tractable manner with less loss of generality than analyses based on one or two selected
diseases, which is representative of current analyses.
 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Because there are a large number of biological agents
that can cause natural or bioterroristic disease out-
breaks—each having the ability to present in many dif-
ferent ways (e.g., few cases, many cases, abrupt onset,
and gradual onset)—the practice of outbreak detection
and investigation are extremely challenging cognitive
activities. Designers of information systems that support
these activities must manage this complexity during the
processes of requirements analysis and speciﬁcation. For
example, designers need to understand for every possible
outbreak presentation of each agent how quickly the
outbreak must be detected and which kinds of surveil-
lance data and analytics are needed to achieve the req-* Corresponding author. Fax: 1-412-383-8135.
E-mail address: mmw@cbmi.pitt.edu (M.M. Wagner).
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doi:10.1016/S1532-0464(03)00065-0uisite timeliness and speciﬁcity of detection. A biological
agent like anthrax, for example, may cause outbreaks
that range in size from one to many cases; are conﬁned
to a single building or aﬀect a widely dispersed area;
range from classic inhalational presentations to pre-
dominantly cutaneous or gastrointestinal presentations;
exhibit tempos that range from a sudden, nearly simul-
taneous appearance of many cases to more protracted
outbreaks due to persistence of the source; and involve
only humans, only animals, or both.
The sheer size of this problem space is a challenge to
developers and researchers and a barrier to progress.
Designers must worry that the requirements they use
adequately cover the space. As just discussed, the space
is multidimensional and includes as axes number of
cases, spatial distribution, temporal distribution, vector,
organism, presentation, and even environmental condi-
tions. Researchers face similar problems when deciding
which threats to study and then in generalizing from
their results to the broader questions of detection of
important threats.
178 M.M. Wagner et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 36 (2003) 177–188There are two possible approaches to design and
analysis when faced with this complexity. The ﬁrst—
which is the current practice—is to ignore the complexity
by restricting attention to a few threats chosen based on
criteria such as urgency or pragmatic research reasons
such as availability of data. ‘‘Threat lists’’ promulgated
by organizations such as CDC, NATO, and others are
one basis for such decisions [1–4]. A key problem with
this approach for system designers is that the designer
has speciﬁcations for a special purpose system only. A
problem for the researcher is that the information de-
veloped by the study illuminates only a small area of the
problem space, oftentimes the same small area. As a
result, information available to designers is concentrated
in a few small regions around the diseases Inﬂuenza [5–
11] and Cryptosporidium [12–17] with less information
available about other diseases (e.g., Anthrax) [18,19].
There is also illumination around respiratory syndrome
[20–22] and gastrointestinal syndrome [22–24] but not
around other important syndromes such as botulism-
like. Large areas of the problem space remain unex-
plored. There is also little understanding of how results
about detection of the studied outbreaks (e.g., Inﬂuenza)
generalize to detection of other types of outbreaks. A
fundamental problem is that many types of outbreaks
have not occurred in recent times (or ever) so cannot be
studied directly and must be understood by simulation
modeling or by analysis of data from similar (surrogate)
outbreaks. There has been no published discussion of
which threats are similar and therefore can be used as
surrogates in research.
The second approach is the one devised for use in this
study. This approach attempts to reduce the complexity
of the problem space by ﬁnding clusters of similar
threats. Because our focus is the design of information
systems, the clustering of threats is based on similarities
in the functional requirements that each threat imposes
on a detection system—threats with similar functional
requirements for detection are grouped together. The
goal of this approach is to develop a parsimonious and
tractable characterization of the problem space for the
purpose of surveillance system design, one that will fa-
cilitate both design of systems and the associated re-
search in public health surveillance that supports system
design. The consequence is that a designer feels conﬁ-
dent that as long as clear speciﬁcations for detection of
one threat in a category are met, the resulting system can
detect any threat from the category. The potential ad-
vantages of a parsimonious characterization are: (1)
focusing more attention on a smaller, but more com-
prehensive set of threats, (2) identifying equivalent
threats that may be more amenable to study because of
availability of data, and (3) improving tractability of
analysis without, ideally, loss of generality.
We created such a set of categories by analyzing the
detection requirements of a large set of biological agentsidentiﬁed from several published threat lists. Our anal-
ysis clustered the threats into a ﬁnal set of nine catego-
ries, each of which represents a fundamentally diﬀerent
problem in the design of detection systems. We also
searched the literature for actual outbreaks of diseases
in each category, ﬁnding examples from each category
that researchers could use in analyses or validation of
detection algorithms. We note that our categories—be-
ing detection problems such as building contamination—
diﬀers from existing lists (which are lists of organisms or
clinical syndromes such as anthrax, inhalational).2. Methods
We started with a large set of biological agents de-
rived from published lists of threats, expanded the set to
include consideration of various outbreak presentations
of the agents (e.g., number of cases, temporal and spa-
tial variations, disease presentation, and route of
transmission), and then clustered the outbreaks and
searched the literature for examples from each category.
2.1. Set of biological agents
We created a set of biological agents by merging lists
of threats developed by the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC), the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization (NATO), the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency (DTRA), and other entities [1–4] (Table 1).
These entities created these lists for diﬀerent purposes
ranging from deﬁning reportable conditions, to priori-
tization of antibiotic stockpiling, to response strategiz-
ing.
In the CDC Critical Agent List [4], Category A agents
are deﬁned as organisms that pose a risk to national
security because they can be easily disseminated or
transmitted person-to-person; cause high mortality, with
potential for major public health impact; might cause
public panic and social disruption; and require special
action for public health preparedness. Category B
agents are second priority agents and include those that
are moderately easy to disseminate; cause moderate
morbidity and low mortality; and require speciﬁc en-
hancements of CDCs diagnostic capacity and enhanced
disease surveillance. A subset of List B agents includes
pathogens that are food borne or waterborne. Category
C include emerging pathogens that could be engineered
for mass dissemination in the future because of avail-
ability; ease of production and dissemination; and po-
tential for high morbidity and mortality and major
health impact.
The Defense Threat Reduction Agency and NATO
have also developed lists of threats (Table 1) [1,25]. The
NATO handbook dealing with potential biological
warfare agents lists 31 infectious agents. These are the
Table 1
Merged lists from CDC, DTRA, National Notiﬁable Diseases, NATO, interview with Russian experts, and USAMRIID
Threat DTRA bioterrorism
list
CDC NATO Russian experts top
11 threats
USAMRIID Reportable
list
Anthrax, inhalational X A-list X Top 4 X X
Botulism X A-list X Top 4 X X
Plague (pneumonic) X A-list X Top 4 X X
Smallpox X A-list X Top 4 X X
Tularemia (inhaled) X A-list X X X X
Hemorrhagic fever viruses (Omsk,
Korean, Ebola, Crimean-Congo,
Marburg, Junin, etc).
X A-list X X X
Brucellosis X B-list X X X
Glanders (Melioidosis) X B-list X X X
Q fever (C. burnetii) X B-list X X X
Cholera X B-list X X X
Clostridium perfringens (epsilon toxin) X B-list X X
Ricin toxin X B-list X X
Lassa fever A-list X X
Yellow fever C-list X X X
Shigellosis X B-list X
Staphylococcal enterotoxins (B, etc.) X B-list X
Encephalitis (Russian spring summer,
eastern equine, Saint Louis,
West Nile, Venezuelan, etc.)
X X X X
Alphaviruses (Venezuelan, eastern,
western, equine encephalomyelitis)
B-list X
Cryptosporidiosis B-list X
Escherichia coli 0157:H7 B-list X
Salmonellosis B-list X
Mycotoxins (trichothecene) X X X
Rickettsial diseases X X X
Typhoid fever X X X
Venezuelan equine encephalitis X X X
Hantaviral diseases C-list X
Tick-borne hemorrhagic fever viruses C-list X
Tick-borne encephalitis viruses C-list X
Tuberculosis C-list X
Chikungunya fever X X
Diphtheria X X
Encephalomyelitis viruses X X
Histoplasmosis X X
Inﬂuenza X X
Marine toxins X X
Palytoxin X X
Psittacosis X X
Rocky mountain spotted fever X X
Saxitoxin X X
Tetrodotoxin X X
Typhus (epidemic rickettsial) X X
Typhus (scrub) X X
Viral infections X X
Western equine X X
Yersinia X X
Viral diseases were often grouped using incompatible groupings and we have not attempted to merge those groups. Diseases appearing on only
one list: Nipah virus (CDC C-list); Coccidioidomycosis, Dengue (NATO); Machupo (USAMRIID); acquired immunodeﬁciency syndrome, Ame-
biasis, Campylobacter, Carbon monoxide poisoning, Chlamydia trachomatis, Congenital rubella syndrome, food poisoning, Giardiasis, Hemophilus
inﬂuenzae type B (HIB), Hepatitis A, Hepatitis B, Hepatitis C, Kawasaki syndrome, Legionnaires disease, Leptospirosis, Lyme disease, Lympho-
granuloma venereum, Malaria, Measles, Meningitis, Mumps, gonorrhoeae, Neisseria meningitidis in blood or csf, Pertussis, Poliomyelitis, Rabies,
Reye syndrome, Rheumatic fever, Rubella, Syphilis, Tetanus, Toxic shock syndrome, Toxoplasmosis, Trichinosis (reportable diseases).
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cance by the United States and Western Europe.
A Russian panel of bioweapons experts reviewed
microbial agents and concluded that 11 were ’’very likelyto be used’’ [2]. The four most likely to be used were
Variola, Yersinia pestis, Bacillus anthracis, and Clos-
tridium botulinum. Also included were Francisella tular-
ensis, Pseudomonas mallei/pseudomallei, Rickettsia spp.,
Table 2
Types of data considered in the analysis
(1) Prodromal phase
(a) Over-the-counter sales of pharmaceuticals
(b) Sentinel population monitoring
(c) Social behavior patterns and changes
(d) Social aggregations: families, co-workers, recreational groups
(e) Location of recent travel or gatherings
(f) Food and water intake
(g) Absenteeism
(2) Clinical phase
(a) HMO usage
(b) Outpatient clinical volumes and diagnoses
(c) Medical queries, web-based, Public Health notiﬁcations, etc
(d) Medical resource utilization
(e) Emergency Department volume and diagnoses
(f) Culture results-precise microbiological identiﬁcation
(g) Resistance pattern identiﬁcation
(h) Radiological reports
(i) Use of non-traditional medicines
(3) Morbidity and mortality
(a) Unusual clinical syndrome occurrence
(b) Unexplained deaths
(c) Poison Center usage
(d) Coroner reports
(4) Allied professional sources
(a) Veterinary illness
(b) Vector surveillance
(c) Industrial theft
(d) Food and water source distribution patterns
(e) Civil engineering data
(f) Weather
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burg, and Inﬂuenza viruses.
Notiﬁable diseases are those diseases that local (state
or county) health departments require providers and
health care institutions to report. The notiﬁable diseases
included in Table 1 are National Notiﬁable Infectious
Diseases from 2001 [3].
There are other lists of threats and diseases of interest
to public health that we did not review. Some are clas-
siﬁed such as the DIA summary used by USAMRIID.
Others are outside the scope of this report because they
are not of central concern to designers of early warning
systems for biodefense. These include nosocomial in-
fections, toxicological threats (because the eﬀect is usu-
ally obvious immediately and therefore early warning is
not a requirement), and chronic diseases.
We merged the lists and sorted the merged list to
bring the threats cited by multiple groups to the top
using a simple point system that assigned one point per
list appearance, an extra point if the threat was on the
CDCs B-list, or among the Soviet top 4, and two extra
points if it was on the CDCs A-list.
2.2. Clustering procedure
Once we had created the merged and sorted list, we
clustered elements from the list as follows: For the
ﬁrst etiologic agent in the merged list, which happened
to be Anthrax, we created a category called, tempo-
rarily, Category I and placed Anthrax in the category
(we later renamed the categories based on the com-
monalities amongst the threats that we had placed
within). We then reviewed the types of anthrax out-
breaks including building contamination, outdoors,
single case, large numbers of cases and others using
our knowledge of medicine, infectious disease, and
public health (Author V.D. is a public health physi-
cian with pediatric infectious disease training, J.D. is a
specialist in infectious disease and informatics, M.A. is
a board certiﬁed toxicologist with military medical
training in the area of weapons of mass destruction,
and author M.M.W. is a specialist in medicine and
informatics) and information in the Control of Com-
municable Disease Manual [26]. We created a detection
system diagram showing the types of data needed for
early detection of this threat and identiﬁed the types
(possibly new) of data analytic processing required for
early detection.
For each remaining disease in the merged list, we
asked whether additional data or analytic components
should be added to our diagram of a detection system.
For example, if the threat involved the water supply and
there was nothing in the diagram referring to analysis of
water supply data, then we added water supply data and
analysis to the diagram and created a new category for
that threat. If no new data or analytics were required,then we added the threat to an existing category based
on similarity, from a detection perspective, to other
threats already in that category. We made notes of any
diﬀerences with diseases already in that category—for
example that the disease had a vector that was not
covered by other diseases already in that category. Once
we had completed the clustering of threats into catego-
ries, we renamed the categories based on the charac-
teristics of the threats within each category.
In judging whether a threat represented a funda-
mentally new problem for early detection, we relied on
our knowledge of what data could contribute to the
detection of the threat. We considered many potential
types of data without consideration of whether such
data were being utilized by any speciﬁc system at present
(or even had been considered relevant to early detection
of that disease), availability, etc. (Table 2). We relied on
our collective research experience with data availability
and value, which is described in [27] for the problem of
early detection of outbreaks in these determinations.
2.3. Representative threats
After we created the categories, we searched the lit-
erature for known outbreaks, bioterrorist events, and
M.M. Wagner et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 36 (2003) 177–188 181outbreaks of emerging infections (listed in a Council of
State and Territorial Epidemiologists position paper on
emerging infections) [28] to identify one threat in the
category that could serve, for research and design pur-
poses, as a representative of the category. We supple-
mented these sources with a review of infectious disease
outbreaks reported in the US in volumes 48 (1999) and
49 (2000) of the Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Re-
port.
As a further analysis, we compared each threat in each
cluster with its representative threat, asking whether the
threat diﬀered from the representative threat in some
way that would bias any design or other analysis (such as
a general assessment of national biodefense capacity).
For example, if a threat required earlier detection than
the representative threat because the underlying disease
had a more rapid time course, we noted that an analysis
would require not only a determination of the capacity
for the representative disease, but also an analytical ad-
justment for the worst-case disease in the category. In the
vector-borne class, for example, an analytical adjustment
would be needed for every vector not covered by the
vectors for West Nile Encephalitis (the representative
disease). One can understand these analytical adjust-
ments within the categories as important variations in
the clusters along one or two dimensions.3. Results
The analysis resulted in nine categories, which rep-
resents a dramatic reduction of the problem space. Table
3 lists the nine categories with a brief description of their
unique detection requirements, the representative threat,
and agents we assigned to the categories. The next sec-
tions describe the categories in detail.
3.1. Large-scale bioaerosol
The ﬁrst category is large-scale bioaerosol release of
non-contagious agents. Speciﬁcally this category in-
cludes intentional, accidental or natural releases of bi-
ologic organisms or their toxins capable of aﬀecting
many individuals.
Although the diseases in this category present with
diﬀerent clinical syndromes, the data sources required
for early detection are similar and the diseases grouped
together on this basis. For early detection of threats in
this category, a detection system would ideally include
components to obtain and process data that are pre-
clinical (e.g., grocery sales) and early clinical (e.g.,
symptoms and radiological reports). Such syndromic
information must be collected and analyzed with at-
tention to corroborating and discriminating data from
other sources, such as wind patterns and physical loca-
tion of individuals in the days preceding onset of illness.We did not ﬁnd modern outbreaks of diseases in this
category. We selected aerosolized B. anthracis to repre-
sent this category because of the threat posed by inha-
lational anthrax, and the existing body of literature and
analysis about inhalational anthrax. Respecting the
limitations of the conﬂicting data about the numbers of
cases from the 1979 Sverdlovsk release of B. anthracis
(Kirov strain) from Soviet Biological Weapons Com-
pound 19, there are some broad conclusions that can be
made. First, rapid detection of diseases in this category
must be given priority because of their lethality. Second,
conventionally trained physicians cannot be relied upon
to detect rapidly outbreaks in this category. For exam-
ple, the earliest suspicion of an anthrax outbreak in
Sverdlovsk came from autopsy ﬁndings (cardinals cap,
a pathognomonic ﬁnding in anthrax) [29].
Many biowarfare agents ﬁt this category, because the
preferred route of deployment is aerosol dissemination.
Some key diﬀerence between the agents in this category
would be the downwind reach or ‘‘footprint’’ size,
infectious dose, lethal dose, incubation period, and
duration of prodomal period. In the case of aerosolized
B. anthracis, a large downwind reach provides the worst-
case example.
3.2. Premonitory release of agent
The second category is premonitory, small-scale re-
lease of an agent. Speciﬁcally, this category includes
intentional, accidental or natural infection of one or a
limited number of individuals with an unusual organ-
ism.
The detection problem here is one of sensitivity for
single cases and small outbreaks, not extreme timeliness.
To detect a single case, extreme speciﬁcity is required
and such speciﬁcity requires either that the prior prob-
ability be extremely high (due to intelligence informa-
tion) or that the patients disease has suﬃciently
declared itself that a physician or pathologist with or
without the assistance of speciﬁc laboratory tests can
conﬁrm the diagnosis. A detection system would require
components that scrutinize diﬀerent sources of data to
establish whether individual patients ﬁt fairly speciﬁc
disease deﬁnitions such as the combination of gram
positive rods in the blood or cerebrospinal ﬂuid
and pneumonia on chest radiograph (which would be
suggestive of anthrax). Examples of such surveillance
system components include clinical information systems
with decision support at the point of care, systems to
monitor laboratory reporting of microbiology cultures
and free-text processing algorithms that scrutinize au-
topsy reports, newspaper stories, and obituaries for
unusual deaths of animals or humans. The demo-
graphics of the victims or the discovery of a geographic
clustering of victims could help to identify a common
cause. In the absence of astute clinical diagnosis, it is
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ized organism will progress to fatality. The detection
problem includes therefore analysis of unexplained
deaths.
The representative threat that we identiﬁed for this
category is human glanders, which is caused by the
agent Burkholderia mallei. We found a case report of
human glanders in Maryland 2000 [30]. This illness—
caused by a potential bioterrorism agent (it is on ﬁve of
the six lists we used to create the merged list)—went
undiagnosed for almost two months despite the fact that
the victim had an occupational history of working with
the agent. Besides glanders, the ﬁrst cases of inhalational
anthrax in October 2001 are also examples from this
category worthy of study by system designers.
This type of threat includes almost all organisms and
information systems will require speciﬁc, computer-in-
terpretable case deﬁnitions for each disease of interest.
The problem of detecting a single case is identical to the
problem of accurate diagnosis in medicine, and there is a
large literature on clinical decision support describing
relevant techniques [31].
3.3. Building/vessel contamination
The third category is the contamination of a building
or other enclosed space with an infectious agent or a
biologic toxin. Speciﬁcally, this category refers to the
distribution of an agent via the mechanical components
in a building or ship. This is an important category
because of modern reliance upon heating, ventilation,
and air-conditioning systems, where victims are linked
to a common air source.
The recognition of a release contained within a
structure presents a diﬀerent problem for detection than
a large-scale aerosol or premonitory release. Speciﬁcally,
the detection of a syndrome common to a relatively
small number of individuals sharing a domicile, a place
of employment, or a social facility requires recognition
and analysis of these relationships. A detection system
ideally would have access to data about heating, venti-
lation, and air conditioning systems (HVAC), identity of
occupants, and hours of occupation. These requirements
are not represented in the previous categories.
For this category, the building contamination with
B. anthracis of a postal facility in New Jersey is an
interesting example for study and validation of detec-
tion systems [32]. Tracing the illnesses to the speciﬁc
building required the knowledge of work times, re-
sponsibilities and routines for a large number of postal
workers. Although not a biological agent and not on
our merged list, carbon monoxide is also a potentially
useful representative for this category because of the
abundance of data on exposures [33–36]. However, in
comparison to other threats in this category, the onset
of symptoms of CO poisoning is immediate so thatvictims typically are found in situ whereas with other
threats an incubation period allows for dispersal of
cases prior to onset of symptoms. Therefore, if CO
poisoning is used analytically to assess requirements
for detection of threats in this category, analytical
adjustments such as distortion of actual data to achieve
artiﬁcial post-exposure dispersion of cases prior to
symptom onset should be used.
3.4. Continuous or intermittent release of an agent
The fourth category is continuous or intermittent
release of an infectious agent or biologic toxin. Speciﬁ-
cally, threats in this category involve low level or low
virulence continuous or intermittent release of an in-
fectious agent or biologic toxin from a point source so
that individuals entering a limited area develop disease
over an extended period of time (a large-scale continu-
ous release would be detectable by methods used for
category 1—Large-scale Bioaerosol). The release could
be intentional, accidental or natural.
Of interest, the Aum Shinrikyo cult used this tech-
nique to disseminate continuously liquid anthrax slurry
over a period of four days from the rooftop of their
building in Tokyo in an attempt to sicken the popula-
tion of the city [29]. Pets and birds were sickened but no
human outbreaks were reported.
Early detection of this type of dissemination would
require analysis of syndromic or disease data not only
on an instantaneous basis, but also a longitudinal basis;
that is, with respect to similar syndromes occurring at
abnormally high levels when analyzed over time. This
category thus presents a requirement for a diﬀerent kind
of manipulation of epidemiological data such as the use
of detection algorithms based on cut point statistics,
explicit models of the expected outbreak, or longer an-
alytic periods.
Legionella pneumophila is a representative disease for
this category with outbreaks of this type occurring in
modern times such as at the Philadelphia Legionnaires
Convention [37,38]. This organism was dispersed con-
tinuously both prior to and during the convention but
its eﬀects on the population went undetected until a
suﬃciently large number of highly susceptible hosts were
exposed. Of note, some recreational water outbreaks
would also be informative about this category, since
individuals are exposed on an ongoing basis from the
same source over time, creating the same temporal
pattern of illnesses [39–41].
3.5. Contagious person-to-person
The ﬁfth category is contagious person-to-person
transmission of an infectious agent. In particular, this
category includes those threats that are spread through
causal contact with a person with the disease. Each
184 M.M. Wagner et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 36 (2003) 177–188individual infected then becomes a potential source
for multiple other individuals whose only relationship
may be sitting or standing near each other in a public
setting.
The recognition of a contagious disease involves de-
tection components described in the previous categories,
but also adds a requirement for components capable of
collecting and analyzing social network and contact in-
formation. Following the initial release or exposure of
the index victims, secondary, tertiary, and quaternary
victim pools are created for each index case until quar-
antine is imposed or the entire population is exposed.
These successive waves of victims present with similar
syndromes, but unlike a continuous point release of a
non-contagious agent in the fourth category, the spread
of communicable disease follows patterns of social as-
sociation. In the case of highly contagious airborne
diseases, this progression can occur rapidly in popula-
tions with close living or working relationships. The
identiﬁcation of a communicable disease and the
populations at risk is critical to management as attenua-
tion of social contact or quarantine is of paramount
importance.
We identiﬁed Inﬂuenza as the representative disease in
this category because it is already the focus of research
in early detection cited earlier. There are several other
diseases in this group (see Table 3) that occur regularly
in outbreak form such as measles [42–46], rubella
[42,47,48], and more recently SARS [49].
Analysis of the other diseases in this category re-
vealed that, in practice, Inﬂuenza detection is somewhat
atypical in that it utilizes patterns of disease on other
continents and remote communities that presage local
disease (and therefore have implications for control
through vaccination). Analytical adjustments of results
about general detection capacity based on inﬂuenza data
might involve blinding the detection system to such data
for diseases that do not have this characteristic.
3.6. Commercially distributed products
The sixth category is contamination of commercially
distributed products, especially food. Food contamina-
tion may be as simple as contamination at the site of
preparation, which is what the Rajneesh cult attempted
in The Dalles, Oregon, or as involved as tampering with
distribution or production facilities [50].
Detection of threats in this category requires analysis
of production and distribution systems in addition to
the longitudinal analyses required for detection of in-
termittent and continuous point source releases. Our
review of outbreaks in this category also identiﬁed the
requirement of incorporating data from routine mo-
lecular ﬁngerprinting of organisms, which has proven
value in the detection of smaller common-cause out-
breaks [51,52]. In the simplest case, detection of a foodborne pattern requires at least two victims, knowledge
of social interactions (to determine a common meal),
and analysis of their food consumption. Analysis of
food borne outbreaks in settings such as banquets
where the victims know each other or the food is con-
sumed in the same location is a routine epidemiological
investigation, performed competently in the United
States. However, when food is consumed at separate
locations and the individuals do not know each other,
detection is more diﬃcult. An ideal detection system for
diseases in this category would integrate a high degree
of behavioral analysis, with sophisticated laboratory
analysis and knowledge of food and distribution
patterns.
Salmonella sp. is a representative agent in this cate-
gory. There are many other diseases listed in Table 3
that occur regularly and that could be used to represent
the group.
3.7. Waterborne
The seventh category of threats is contamination of a
potable water supply (well or surface water). Although
American cities enjoy closed source water supplies that
minimize simple contamination, large-scale outbreaks
due to contamination do occur and these water supplies
are still vulnerable to sabotage or deliberate tampering
at water treatment and storage facilities. Population
centers rely on a relatively small number of water supply
facilities; therefore it is theoretically possible (although
diﬃcult due to dilutional eﬀects) to expose a large
number of individuals with a single act of contamina-
tion.
This category presents the requirement that the de-
tection system have components that analyze data about
the water supply to assess whether waterborne trans-
mission of a biological agent can explain patterns of
illness occurring in the community.
Cryptosporidiosis is the representative threat because
of the existence of large outbreaks for study such as ones
in Milwaukee and other regions that resulted from
contamination of a water supply [12–17,53].
3.8. Vector/host borne
The eighth category is vector and host borne disease.
It includes all outbreaks involving the transmission of
an agent via an insect vector or animal host. The char-
acteristic epidemic pattern of natural occurrences of
diseases in this category is host disease followed by
vector disease followed by human disease.
Detection of outbreaks in this category presents a
new requirement that the detection system monitor
vectors and hosts of the biological agents. For example,
detection systems would have to incorporate data from
veterinary sources to monitor animal vectors and hosts.
M.M. Wagner et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 36 (2003) 177–188 185West Nile encephalitis is the representative threat for
this category because of its recent occurrence and spread
[54–57].
Analysis of the other diseases in this category reveals
marked heterogeneity in vectors. Therefore, any analysis
of general capacity would have to use an adjunct
checklist of vectors (rat, ﬂea, tick, horse, swine, bat,
primates, and bird). The existence of an early warning
capability for Rift Valley fever based on satellite image
analysis suggests that the ability to process environ-
mental data represent an additional requirement for
detection systems [58].
3.9. Sexually transmitted
The ninth category of threats is biological agents
transmitted through sexual or other intimate contact
such as the sharing of needles.
For detection of outbreaks in this category, syndrome
recognition, and pathogen identiﬁcation must be com-
bined with analysis of social and sexual behavior pat-
terns. We diﬀerentiated this category from other forms
of social and behavioral analysis such as those that may
contribute to early detection of epidemics of contagious
diseases because the data collection enabling the analysis
of sexual behavior patterns is diﬃcult, requires sensi-
tivity, and may infringe on legal rights. A key detection
problem raised by this category is identifying a carrier
who is infecting other individuals (either intentionally or
unintentionally).
We have chosen human immunodeﬁciency virus (HIV)
as the representative disease in this category because it
best exempliﬁes the challenges expected to be encoun-
tered in this group.4. Discussion
Progress in science is facilitated when complexity can
be reduced without loss of generality. The method de-
scribed in this paper reduced a high dimensional, very
large problem space to nine categories of biological
threats. The new typology is not a simple reduction
along any single axis—several of the new categories diﬀer
along multiple axes including size of outbreak (large
cohort versus single case), spatial distribution (in
building versus open air), route of dissemination (per-
son-to-person, air, food, water, and vector), and time
(sudden versus continuous).
Our approach diﬀers fundamentally from the list-of-
threats approach in that it was designed speciﬁcally to
reduce the problem space without loss of generality.
Lists used by CDC, NATO, and others merely enu-
merate threats whereas our categories represent types of
threats (e.g., building contamination) each of which pre-
sents unique requirements for the design of informationsystems used to detect outbreaks due to the various
threats.
The principal contribution of this paper is a meth-
odological one: a suggested criterion set of nine types of
threats that designers of surveillance systems can use to
develop requirements and speciﬁcations. Additionally,
we suggest speciﬁc examples of disease outbreaks to
study and provide references to those outbreaks. We
note that several categories have received little attention
from researchers concerned with early detection of
outbreaks and deserve heightened awareness so that
complete requirements for detection systems become
available. Such analyses are vitally important to un-
derstand the nations current ability to detect bioter-
rorism, and to inform the design of early warning
systems for disease outbreaks. We recommend that re-
searchers studying these questions consider using the
categories we identiﬁed, rather than or at least in addi-
tion to other lists. We have ourselves used this set in an
analysis of the nations current capacity to detect biot-
errorism [59].
Some of our categories—identiﬁed by a ﬁrst principle
analysis of the data and data analytic problems posed by
the threats—happen to correspond to organizational
divisions within public health surveillance (e.g., sexually
transmitted, communicable, vector borne, water borne,
and food borne). This coincidence may reﬂect the fact
that public health has over time grouped diseases and
threats based in part on their similarities from the per-
spective of detection, especially with respect to the types
of data collections and analyses required to achieve
greater eﬃciency through sharing similar surveillance
and investigation resources (e.g., epidemiological skills,
methods, and knowledge of surveillance personnel)
needed by all threats in a category. (It is worth noting
that with the advent of information technology, these
departmental specializations resulted in undesirable si-
loing of information systems and that the authors of this
paper recommend that the speciﬁc requirements identi-
ﬁed for each of the nine categories be pooled to create an
overall set of requirements for an integrated approach to
surveillance.) It is also possible that our research team
was inﬂuenced by an anthropomorphic tendency to as-
sume that automatic systems will use the same data and
analytic approaches as humans, although we think this
eﬀect is unlikely because we used very diﬀerent
assumptions about the types of data that would be
available for analysis. For example, we assumed that
many types of data that are not ordinarily collected by
surveillance systems (they are only collected during
investigations) could be made available routinely
for surveillance through new information systems. We
assumed that variables typically ascertained by investi-
gators manually could be derived automatically and
possibly indirectly by inference from existing data
sources.
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and diﬀerent problem in detection. It is diﬃcult to prove
a claim that such a radical compression of the problem
space can be achieved without any loss of generality,
and in fact mail dissemination as a route of dissemina-
tion was not identiﬁed by our analysis (which was con-
ducted prior to October 2001), so the authors do not
wish to make that claim. A defensible claim is that this
new set of criterion threats is a more complete charac-
terization than current approaches. One can ask, for
example, whether this set will be more useful to
designers than alternative sets such as the CDC A-list—
comprising inhalational Anthrax, Botulism, Plague
(pneumonic), Smallpox, Tularemia (inhaled), Hemor-
rhagic fever viruses (Omsk, Korean, Ebola, Crimean-
Congo, Marburg, Junin), and Lassa fever. From a
designers perspective, the A-list is redundant for aerosol
releases (anthrax, tularemia, and plague). It is not ex-
plicit about the design requirements related to detection
of single cases and building contaminations. Although
recent experience with anthrax makes those require-
ments implicit, they might be overlooked by designers.
Similarly, it is not explicit that botulismmaps into design
requirements for the detection of outbreaks caused by
both food and water supply contaminations. The A-list
does not consider continuous releases and sexually
transmitted methods of dissemination and would not
encourage a systematic examination of similar threats in
each category to ensure that additional design require-
ments were identiﬁed. In general, the threat lists are
disproportionately weighted with diseases from the
aerosolized/weaponized category suggesting that such
threat lists do not represent fully the problem space.
This would imply caution in using such threat lists alone
for guiding development or assessment of detection
capacity.
We note that alternative characterizations of the
problem space are possible. For example, Wagner [60]
describes a division into two parts. The ﬁrst category
was cohort exposures, in which many individuals are
infected nearly simultaneously through contamination
of the air, food, or water. These individuals move
through the phases of illness together as a cohort and it
is essential that they be detected at the early syndromic
phase through spatial and temporal analysis of syn-
dromic data if the outbreak is to be detected early en-
ough to mitigate mortality and morbidity. The second
category was outbreaks that present initially with few
cases such as smallpox or any threat that falls into the
above premonitory release of agent category. The latter
category will be dependent on astute clinicians or pa-
thologists not missing the ﬁrst case. The two category
division of the problem space is useful because it sug-
gests that both syndromic approaches and approaches
based on improving the diagnostic and management
abilities of front-line clinicians are both necessary, but itdoes not provide suﬃcient detail for designers of early
warning systems.
Important questions for future study include further
deﬁning the detection requirements for each category.
The rational development of public health surveillance
systems depends on more exact speciﬁcation of the
timeliness requirements created by the aggressiveness of
speciﬁc diseases. A timeliness analysis is best paired with
a cost estimation of the costs of false alarms. Such
analyses will form a framework for understanding which
data are needed to detect each threat and the design
problems associated with obtaining such data within
that time requirement.
A second important question for future study is an
extension of our analysis to toxicological, nosocomial,
and possibly chronic diseases because of the dual and
triple use of detection systems for these purposes.5. Conclusions
The very large numbers of disease outbreaks can be
clustered into nine categories, which represent funda-
mentally diﬀerent problems in outbreak detection. There
are recent examples for almost all categories for re-
searchers to study, with the exception of the pattern
‘‘large-scale aerosol release.’’ These categories can be
used as a Criterion Set against which the nations ca-
pacity to detect both naturally occurring and bioterro-
ristic disease can be analyzed.Acknowledgments
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